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Abstract
Differences in market structures may affect the manner in which fundamental information is
incorporated into prices. High levels of quote and trade transparency plus substantial quoting
obligations in European government securities markets ensure that prices are informationally
efﬁcient. The relationship between price changes, order ﬂow, relative depth and spreads across
European and Canadian short-term government bond markets is examined via a reduced-form
vector autoregression model. In European markets, dealers are able to quickly absorb private
information elsewhere in the market. Consequently, spreads and the relative depth on the bid and
offer sides of the market are found to be only slightly informative. Similarly, order ﬂow, which
reﬂects inventory management practices in addition to private information, explains a smaller
proportion of the variation in asset returns in European markets than in Canadian interdealer
brokered markets where no quoting obligations exist.
JEL classiﬁcation: G12, G14, G15
Bank classiﬁcation: Market structure and pricing; Financial markets; Interest rates
Résumé
Les différences de structure de marché peuvent inﬂuer sur la manière dont l’information
fondamentale est intégrée aux prix. Le degré élevé de transparence en amont et en aval des
transactions et les rigoureuses obligations de cotation sur les marchés européens de titres d’État
assurent l’efﬁcience informationnelle des prix. À l’aide d’un modèle vectoriel autorégressif de
forme réduite, les auteurs analysent la relation entre les variations de prix, le ﬂux d’ordres, les
écarts acheteur-vendeur et la différence de profondeur entre les deux côtés du carnet sur les
marchés européens et canadiens des obligations d’État à court terme. Sur les marchés européens,
les opérateurs peuvent assimiler rapidement l’information privée détenue par d’autres
participants. Par conséquent, les écarts acheteur-vendeur et la différence de profondeur entre les
deux côtés du carnet se révèlent peu informatifs. De même, le ﬂux d’ordres, qui traduit aussi bien
les pratiques de gestion des stocks que l’information privée, explique une proportion plus faible
de la variation des rendements sur les marchés européens que sur le marché canadien du courtage
intermédiaire, où il n’y a aucune obligation de cotation.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G12, G14, G15
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Structure du marché et ﬁxation des prix; Marchés ﬁnanciers;
Taux d’intérêt  1 
1. Introduction 
 
The behaviour of market participants, and their trading and quoting decisions, will be affected by 
how a financial market is organized. The results of this paper confirm previous findings, and 
provide some new insight into how price and liquidity dynamics are affected by the structure of 
government bond markets in Europe and, by comparison, in Canada. In Europe, interdealer 
trading in the most liquid government bonds occurs on the Mercato Telematico dei Titoli de Stato 
(MTS) platform. This segment of the market functions as an electronic limit order book. With the 
introduction of a “liquidity pact” in 1999, MTS market makers are required to post buy and sell 
limit orders above a minimum size, within a maximum bid-offer spread, for a minimum number 
of hours each day. In contrast, Canadian bond dealers have no quoting obligations.
1  
 
European and Canadian bond market structures also differ with respect to quote and trade 
transparency. The MTS platform makes pre- and post-trade information available to interested 
participants in real time via Bloomberg and Reuters. In Canada, only the best quotes available at 
each individual interdealer broker are observable to the market. This paper addresses whether 
differences in these market structures has an impact on the dynamics of prices, and more 
importantly, the process in which fundamental information is incorporated into prices. 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) provide evidence from experimental settings that suggest that 
transparency significantly improves a market’s informational efficiency but that spreads will 
widen and depth will fall as the risks borne by dealers increase. In this paper, we attempt to 
determine if markets remain efficient once quoting obligations are imposed on dealers in a 
transparent market. 
 
Asymmetric information may exist in government securities markets even though these securities 
have fixed and known cash flows and a finite life. For example, market participants have 
heterogeneous models of interest rates relating macroeconomic fundamentals, including news 
announcements, to prices and yields. Since markets do not clear instantaneously, prices at any 
point in time may not reflect all fundamental information available in the market. To characterize 
all aspects of the price discovery process, we investigate the joint relationship between price 
changes, order flow, the relative depth on the bid and offer sides of the market, and spreads, 
across several short-term European and Canadian government securities markets. When 
                                                   
1 Unless otherwise indicated, any mention of “markets”, “dealers” or “participants” relate to government 
bond markets.   2 
information is incomplete and heterogeneous, market participants’ subjective valuations of a 
security may be captured by the latter three variables.  
 
Order flow is defined as the number of buyer- less seller-initiated trades. Green (2004), Brandt 
and Kavajecz (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega (2006) demonstrate that order flow has a 
permanent impact on the price of government securities. We extend their analysis by examining 
the role of relative depth and spreads in the price discovery process. Relative depth is calculated 
as the difference between the quantity of a security available for purchase at the best bid quote in 
the market and the quantity available for sale as the best offer quote in the market. As usual, 
spreads are the difference between those best offer and bid quotes. Recent microstructure 
literature demonstrates that market participants may learn new information from the supply of 
liquidity in the market. Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005) illustrate how informed traders will 
use both market orders and limit orders strategically in an electronic limit order market. Goettler, 
Parlour and Rajan (2005) illustrate that limit orders placed by informed traders reveal new 
information about the underlying value of an asset. Thus relative depth and spreads, like order 
flow, may also convey information and have an impact on the price discovery process.  
 
Depth and spreads are also associated with measures of liquidity in the market. Earlier 
microstructure studies demonstrated that the supply of liquidity and informed trading are related. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that uninformed discretionary liquidity traders will trade 
around the same time, increasing liquidity in the market, and reducing the losses they suffer to 
informed traders. Kim and Verrecchia (1994), on the other hand, illustrate that if informed traders 
possess an informational advantage after an event, liquidity will remain low as long as those 
informed traders maintain that advantage. Therefore, the supply of liquidity in markets affects, 
and is affected by, the speed with which information is incorporated into prices. In addition, 
recent literature on the pricing of securities, most notably, Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
Garleanu and Pedersen (2004), and Vayanos (2004) point out that illiquidity is priced in financial 
markets, and that investors will demand compensation in terms of an illiquidity premia on their 
required rate of return.  
 
Motivated by questions associated with the relationship between price changes, order flow, 
relative depth and spreads, we utilize the framework of Hasbrouck (1991a, b), Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2000, 2001), Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) and examine the 
dynamic interactions between these variables via a reduced-form vector autoregression (VAR) 
model. We find relative depth in the market explains some of the variability in prices in Europe   3 
although the magnitude is relatively small. In addition, the absence of quoting restrictions 
contributes to informative market-wide spreads in the Canadian market. Generally, a liquidity 
premia will be demanded by investors when spreads widen to reflect a fall in liquidity. Finally, 
when there is a risk that private information in the market will not be resolved immediately, 
investors that are contemplating holding the security in their portfolio will demand a required rate 
of return that includes an information risk premium.  
 
Order flow is more informative in the Canadian market. Restrictions on quotes in European 
markets allow dealers to share their inventory risk cheaply through the immediate execution of 
market orders. Consequently, order flow reflects both inventory management and private 
information considerations, and for this reason it explains a smaller proportion of the variation in 
returns then in Canadian interdealer brokered markets where no quoting obligations exist. While 
the results of this study suggest that market structure is important, within a couple of hours 
private information in either marketplace is found to have dissipated---revealed either through the 
relative depth in the market, spreads, or order flow. 
 
Microstructure studies of government securities markets have predominantly focused on U.S. 
Treasury markets. For example, Green (2004) examines the impact of macroeconomic news 
announcements and their associated uncertainty on the U.S. benchmark five-year bond while 
Pasquariello and Vega (2006) examine the effect of unanticipated order flow on yield changes in 
the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year U.S. Treasury bond (or note) markets. In addition, little is known 
about the price discovery process in government fixed-income markets for securities with shorter 
maturities. In particular, the trading and quoting strategies of dealers may be different from those 
at the longer end of the yield curve. In the short-term sector, financial market participants build 
positions based on their views of the expected future path of overnight interest rates. There is one 
important exception. Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) examine the role that order flow and liquidity 
in price discovery across the entire U.S. yield curve. The authors utilize traditional yield curve 
modeling techniques to isolate the major latent factors driving order flow and liquidity. Findings 
suggest that the effect of order flow is strongest when liquidity is low. We address a similar 
question but instead uncover the direct relationships between order flow, depth, spreads and 
prices. We also analyse individual government securities markets outside the extremely liquid 
U.S. Treasury market. 
   4 
2. Institutional Structure and Data 
 
There are some important differences between the organization of European and Canadian 
Treasury markets. In Europe, the dominant interdealer electronic trading platform for fixed-
income securities is MTS.
2 Given the large and unpredictable inventory shocks typically faced by 
dealers in their trades with customers, interdealer debt markets have developed to facilitate 
inventory management and risk sharing. Interdealer trading accounts for more than half of all 
trades.
3 A number of dealers active on MTS are designated as primary dealers. They are assigned 
to individual securities and must fulfill a number of requirements. In particular, primary dealers 
must provide two-sided quotes continuously for a minimum amount of time each day during 
regular trading hours. In addition, minimum quote amounts and a maximum bid-offer spread are 
imposed. Compliance with these quoting obligations is strictly monitored by MTS. In return for 
meeting these commitments, primary dealers are allowed to bid in Treasury auctions and enjoy 
privileged relations with the issuing authorities.  
 
In Government of Canada bond markets, government securities dealers may also be designated as 
primary dealers. If dealers provide evidence of sufficient resources and a desire to participate 
actively in the market-making activity of Government of Canada securities they will enjoy 
preferential access to securities auctions. While there are incentives to actively make markets, 
unlike European markets, there are no specific quoting obligations in Canada. Dealer behaviour is 
not governed by rules that directly limit bid-offer spreads or enhance depth. Furthermore, dealers 
can freely enter and exit the market at any time.  
 
In the Canadian government securities market, dealers can trade directly or execute anonymous 
buy and sell orders at one of four interdealer brokers (IDB). Based on dealer statistics reported to 
the Canadian Investment Dealer Association and the Bank of Canada, the Canadian interdealer 
debt market represented approximately 46 per cent of the total secondary Government of Canada 
bond market trading volume during 2002, of which IDB trading accounted for 86 per cent (up 
from 50 per cent in 1991 and 75 per cent in 1997).  The introduction of IDBs significantly 
reduced the role of direct interdealer trading in recent years. The current IDBs disseminate quote 
information electronically though actual brokered trades are still executed over the phone. 
                                                   
2 MTS was created in 1988 by the Italian Treasury and the Bank of Italy with the objective of increasing 
competition and efficiency in the market for government debt. MTS became a private company in 1997. 
3 The Bond Market Association (TBMA, 2005).   5 
Participants communicate with brokers over the telephone but each participant can observe best 
bid and offer quotes, and trade outcomes, on a computer screen once they are posted.
4  
 
Transparency in the Canadian interdealer government securities market is provided by brokers 
who publish interdealer quotes.
5 At any one broker, only the best quotes and their respective 
quote amounts are visible. Participants observing quotes across the multiple IDBs may be able to 
determine a noisy measure of the overall depth of the market. The MTS limit order book market 
is more transparent. Dealing quotes are centralized and market participants observe the top 5 
quotes on either side of the market and the associated quote amounts. In addition, the last traded 
price is observable.  
 
European government bonds can be listed on a domestic MTS platform (such as MTS France) 
and/or the EuroMTS electronic trading system.
6 Those fixed income securities that satisfy a 
number of listing requirements, such as exceeding a required principal amount outstanding and 
certification that a number of dealers that will act as market markers in that security, can be listed 
on EuroMTS. All government marketable securities, in addition to benchmarks, are listed on their 
respective domestic MTS platform (subject to a given outstanding principal amount). Cheung, de 
Jong and Rindi (2005) find that trading costs are similar on both platforms. In our study, we 
examine trade and quote information for Treasury bills and short-term Treasury bonds listed on 
the domestic market platform since almost all trading in these securities occurs on the domestic 
MTS platforms.  
 
The MTS dataset includes all updates of the best quotes and the associated quote amounts for 
each security in addition to transaction prices and traded quantities. The dataset also includes 
information about the time and the direction of each trade, i.e., whether the trade was executed 
against the bid or the offer side of the market. Our analysis focuses on European Treasury bills 
listed on the four largest domestic MTS platforms: MTS Italy, MTS Germany, MTS France and 
MTS Belgium. We analyse short-term government bill data for securities with a maturity from 6 
months to 2 years. The MTS data set spans the period from 1 April, 2003 to 31 December 2004. 
The MTS market is open for trading from 8:15 to 17:30 (Central European Time, CET)
7. 
                                                   
4 The four Canadian IDBs are Freedom International Brokerage Company, Prebon Canada Ltd., Shorcan 
Brokers Limited, and Tullett Liberty (Canada) Ltd. 
5 More recently, electronic platforms have been introduced in Canada that offer simultaneous 
multipledealer quote inquiries and trading in one case, and peer-to-peer, order-driven trading in another. 
6 EuroMTS was introduced in 1999. 
7 There is a pre-trade session in the MTS market from 7:45 to 8:15 (CET). During this time, dealers can 
post limit orders but they are not allowed to trade on these orders.   6 
Accounting for trade and quote activity, we divide the trading day into 30-minute intervals from 
8:30 till 17:30. The bonds analysed in our study include: the 6-month Italian Treasury Certificate 
(BOT), the 6-month French Treasury Bill (FTB), the 6-month German Treasury Certificate 
(GTC), the 12-month Belgian Treasury Certificate, the 12-month Italian Treasury Certificate 
(BOT), the 12-month French Treasury Bill (FTB), and the 2-year German Treasury Bond 
(Schätze).   
 
The Canadian dataset was obtained from CanPx---a data service that consolidates and 
disseminates to interested subscribers anonymous trade and quote data submitted by Canada’s 
fixed-income interdealer brokers (IDBs).  The CanPx data set is relatively complete, receiving 
quote and trade information from all IDBs. Dealers leave firm quotes with a broker, along with a 
minimum size that they are willing to trade. The best quotes across all the participating dealers 
are collected by CanPx. We focus the analysis on the 2-year Canadian bond since quote and 
transaction frequency is relatively small for Government of Canada 6- and 12-month bills in the 
IDB sphere. 
 
The CanPx dataset spans the period from 1
 October 2003 to 31 October 2004. We divide the 
trading day into 30-minute intervals from 8:30 (Eastern Daylight Time, EDT) to 17:30 (EDT). 
The following trade and quote information relating to a particular security is used: all updates of 
the best bid and offer prices across all IDBs, the total amount offered and bid at these best prices, 
the time at which the best bid and offer were last updated, and the time and direction of each 
trade. The raw data is filtered for outliers associated with data entry errors. The methodology 
employed is described in D’Souza, Gaa and Yang (2004). In addition, we discard days with less 
than 5 hours of trading. This alleviates problems associated with stale quotes.
8   
 
The datasets exclude days with major macroeconomic news announcements. Many authors, 
including Fleming and Remolona (1999), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) and Green (2004), 
find overwhelming evidence of a public information price discovery process that is distinct from 
that observed during normal trading periods. For the Canadian market, we exclude days in which 
an important U.S. or Canadian macroeconomic news announcement occurred. These news 
announcements are based on Gravelle and Moessner (2001) and the finding that Canadian interest 
rates react significantly to U.S. macroeconomic news. For each European security, days where 
there are either European-wide or individual country macroeconomic news announcements 
                                                   
8 We also discarded data for MTS on 2 August 2004.  A liquidity shock occurred when Citibank sold 11.3 
billion euros worth of government bonds on the MTS platform.   7 
similar to those chosen for Canada and the U.S. are excluded. All important macroeconomics new 
announcements are listed in Table 1. 
 
3. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Dealers with private information regarding the mispricing of a security have a number of options 
that they may employ in order to maximize profits. If the information is likely to be discovered in 
a short amount of time, dealers may execute market orders against the prevailing best bid and 
offer quotes. If some degree of post-trade transparency exists in the market, executed trades will 
provide a signal to the rest of the market that current prices are not efficient. Kyle (1985) and 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) illustrate how dealers revise their expectation when they observe 
trading in the market. If market orders provide a signal to the market about the existence of 
private information, then order flow, defined as the signed number of trades over a given time 
period, will also be informative. Green (2004), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) and Pasquariello and 
Vega (2006), have all shown that in fixed-income markets order flow captures the arrival of 
information and has a permanent impact on prices.  
 
If traders are patient and believe that in the short-run their private information will not be 
revealed to the market, they have other options. In particular, they can post limit orders with 
either better bid or offer prices, or they may adjust their existing orders in terms of the relative 
quantities they are willing to buy and sell at the current best market quotes. For example, if 
private information suggests that a security is overpriced, i.e., the midpoint between the best offer 
and best bid quotes is too high, traders may improve upon the best offer price in the market, or 
they may increase the relative amount that they are willing to sell versus buy at slightly better 
prices. Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005) illustrate in an experimental setting how informed 
traders will use limit orders strategically in an electronic limit order market. Goettler, Parlour and 
Rajan (2005) show that less informed agents can learn about new information from quotes in the 
order book. In general, relative depth and market spreads, like order flow can be informative. 
Since significant levels of quote transparency are present in European and Canadian markets, 
over time private information will trickle out into the market. 
 
Quoting obligations and higher levels of transparency in Europe may prevent market participants 
from manipulating limit and market orders excessively. In particular, market participants are able 
to quickly absorb private information elsewhere in the market by observing changes in the limit   8 
order book and order flow. Restrictions on quotes allow dealers to share their inventory risk 
cheaply through the immediate execution of market orders. Consequently, order flow will reflect 
both inventory management and private information considerations, and for this reason explains a 
smaller proportion of the variation in returns than in Canadian interdealer brokered markets 
where no quoting obligations exist. In general, while it is easier for dealers in MTS to manage 
their inventories it may also be harder to exploit information strategically. Quoting restrictions 
may also contribute to uninformative spreads. When there is a risk that private information in the 
market will not be resolved immediately, spreads will widen, and investors contemplating holding 
the security in their portfolio may demand a return that includes an information risk premium.  
 
 
We analyse the interaction between price changes, order flow and two separate dimensions of the 
order book: relative depth and the best bid-offer spread. The change in the mid-quote is defined 
as  
1000 * ) ( 1 - - = D t t t quote   mid quote   mid p    
where  t quote   mid  is the average of the best offer quote and the best bid quote at the end of each 
period t. Order flow of each security,  t orderflow , is the defined as the aggregate number of 
buyer-initiated orders minus as the aggregate number of seller-initiated orders during the half-
hour interval, t. The relative depth of the market,  t rdepth is defined as  
) k price he best as depth at t id price the best b (depth at  t t -  
where  t depth  is the aggregate order size available for purchase or sale at the best price at the end 
of each period t. The best bid-offer spread is defined as the difference between the best offer price 
and the best bid price times 100, 
( ) 100 * price bid best price ask best spreadt - = . 
 
Table 2 presents a number of descriptive statistics for each variable. The variables are measured 
in 30-minute intervals resulting in 18 intervals per trading day. Since we have excluded days with 
important macroeconomic news announcements, and the number varies by country, we also 
report the number of days examined for each security.  
 
There are a number of similarities across securities. Mid-quote changes, order flow and relative 
depth are not significantly different from zero. Bid depth is positively correlated with mid-quote 
changes while offer depth is negatively correlated with mid-quote changes. Dealers may take   9 
timely advantage of any improved liquidity on one side of the market by executing limit orders 
against it, which may then lead to an increase in the mid-quote. 
 
There are other interesting patterns. Spreads increase with the maturity of a security. French, 
Italian and German 6-month bill spreads are narrower than their one- or two-year national 
counterparts. The autocorrelation in order flow is small. This is consistent with the random walk 
nature regarding the arrival of information. Order flow is positively correlated with changes in the 
mid-quote across all securities. The correlation ranges from 0.06 in the German 2-year bond to 
0.2 in the Italian 12-month bill.  There is mixed evidence associated with the correlation between 
order flow and spreads, and between relative depth and spreads. 
 
Compared to European fixed income markets, the Canadian 2-year bond market has a lower 
average level of depth on either side of the market. This could be due to the fact that the quantity 
quoted in Canadian markets is only the lower bound that dealers are willing to trade. There are no 
obligations in Canada for dealers to post minimum levels of depth in the market. The Canadian 
market also exhibits a stronger correlation between order flow and the change in mid-quotes, and 
between spreads and the change in mid-quotes. As expected, depth and spreads are more 
persistent across European securities. The autocorrelation in spreads is greater than 0.5 in all 
European markets. Quoting obligations constrain the maximum spread dealers are allowed to post 
in the limit order book. The autocorrelation in bid and offer depth may also be larger for this 
reason.  
 
4. Methodology: Econometric Specification 
 
In the paper, we use a vector autoregression model to capture the intertemporal associations 
between changes in quotes, order flow, relative depth, and spreads. The motivation for using this 
general setup is that all four variables are interrelated. Causality among these variables could 
potentially run in both directions. For example, the execution of a market order will directly 
affect the market depth on one side of the market. The execution of market orders will also affect 
the future placement and cancellation of limit-orders. Conversely, market orders will only be 
executed if a certain amount of depth is available in the market. Complicating things further, even 
after allowing for causality between order flow and relative depth in both directions, the 
relationship between depth and order flow will depend on the size of the existing bid-offer spread   10 
in the market. In order to determine the implied impact of order flow, relative depth, spreads and 
quotes, it is necessary to capture the dynamic relationship between all variables simultaneously. 
 
We follow Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b) and calculate two statistics derived from the estimates of a 
VAR. Impulse response functions and variance decompositions of mid-quote returns provide a 
measure of the informativeness of order flow, spreads, and relative depth in each market. In 
general, impulse response functions represent the expected future values of each variable in a 
system of equations conditional on an initial shock. In the current environment, they summarize 
the permanent impact of an innovation in each variable on prices. Any permanent impact must 
reflect available private information contained in that variable. The second measure we use is a 
variance decomposition of mid-quote returns. Observed mid-quotes can be thought of as the sum 
of an efficient price and a term reflecting short-term microstructure imperfections. We 
decompose the variance of these efficient prices into components that are attributable to order 
flow, spreads, and relative depth.   
 
We estimate the following VAR system, 
t P t P t t t v D D D y A y A y A y + + + + + + + + = - - - 9 2 1 2 2 1 1 ... ... , 
where t y  is defined as 
]' , , , [ t t t t t quote mid spread rdepth orderflow y D =  
and the  p A ’s are (p ·p) coefficient matrices of the endogenous variables,  t y . The 
disturbance, t v is a column vector with mean zero,  0 ) ( = t v E , serially uncorrelated disturbances, 
and covariance matrix  W = ] ' [ t tv v E . Hourly dummies, i D , control for the intra-day seasonality. 
The parameters p A  andW are unknown and have to be estimated before the necessary impulse 
response and variance decomposition statistics can be calculated. Estimates of these parameters 
can be obtained from least squares. See Hamilton (1994) and Judge et al. (1982) for a discussion 
of these methods.  
 
There is little theoretical guidance regarding the appropriate ordering of mid-quote changes, order 
flow, relative depth and spreads in the VAR. Since identification in crucial, all orderings of order 
flow, relative depth and spreads were examined to ensure robustness of our results. It is standard 
to place the change in the mid-quote last. The order of the VAR was chosen using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). 
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5. Empirical Results  
 
Vector autoregressions are estimated for each of the eight securities in our sample, and consist of 
four equations that model the interaction between the change in the mid-quote, order flow, 
relative depth, and spreads. Three lags were chosen for most of the 6- and 12-month securities. 
For the 2-year bonds, two lags minimized the AIC or SIC criteria. The last row in Table 3 reports 
the chosen lag order for each estimated VAR. 
 
To conserve space, the coefficient estimates are not presented in tables. There are a number of 
interesting findings that are summarized now. Across all securities, there is evidence of positive 
and significant own-lag effects in the order flow, relative depth, and spread equations. The 
coefficient on the first lag is generally positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. With 
respect to the order flow equation, results suggests that there is a certain degree of momentum 
buying and selling, which may be an indication of order fragmentation. In transparent markets, 
dealers will attempt to hide their orders, and any private information that they reflect, by 
breaking-up their trades. Autocorrelation in spreads and relative depth may reflect market 
conventions or the constraints on spread and quote amounts imposed on MTS dealers. Changes in 
mid-quotes are negatively autocorrelated and statistically significant at the 10% level in the case 
of the French 6-month bill, the Italian 6-month bill, the German 6-month bill, the Italian 12-
month note, and the Canadian 2-year bond. These results suggest the existence of inventory 
control and lagged adjustment effects. In particular, quotes may over-react to trades as dealers 
attempt to manage their inventories. Over time, these effects will dissipate. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1981) illustrate how undesired inventories impose costs on 
dealers, and that these costs are reflected in bid and offer prices. 
 
There are a number of interesting results associated with cross-effects. Lag order flow has a 
significant impact on mid-quotes in Italian and German 6-month bill markets, German and French 
12-month bill markets, and German and Canadian 2-year bond markets. Relative depth has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on mid-quotes in all markets except for the German 6-
month bill and the Canada 2-year bond markets. Spreads have a statistically significant positive 
or negative impact in the following securities markets: Italian 6-month, Belgian 12-month, Italian 
12-month, French 12-month and Canadian 2-year. These results suggest that order flow, relative 
depth, and spreads may indeed convey information about the mis-pricing of government   12 
securities in fixed income markets. Nevertheless, an essential question addressed below is 
whether innovations in these variables have effects that are permanent. 
 
One of the key questions that can be addressed with a VAR is how useful some variables are in 
forecasting others. Table 3 presents the results of pair-wise Granger-causality tests. One variable 
is said to Granger-cause another if past information about the latter variable helps to improve the 
forecasts of the former. We test the null hypothesis that variable x does not Granger-cause 
variable z by testing whether the lag coefficients of x are jointly zero in the equation with z as a 
dependent variable.  
 
For the Canadian 2-year bond, Wald test statistics indicate that there is two-way causality 
between relative depth and mid-quote changes. In the Italian 6-month bill market, order flow, 
relative depth and spreads each Granger-cause mid-quote changes. There is no evidence of 
causality in the opposite direction. In the German 6-month market, spreads, relative depth, and 
order flow do not Granger-cause mid-quote changes. Instead, relative depth, spreads and mid-
quote changes Granger-cause order flow. The results associated with the Belgian 12-month bill 
indicate that order flow, relative depth and spread variables do not Granger-cause changes in mid-
quotes, but that order flow Granger-causes changes in the relative depth of the market. For the 
Italian 12-month security, relative depth Granger-causes changes in the mid-quote, though there 
is no evidence in the other direction. In the 12-month French bill market, relative depth Granger-
causes changes in mid-quotes, spreads and order flow. For the German 2-year bond, relative 
depth is found to Granger-cause change in mid-quotes. Lastly, for the Canadian 2-year bond, 
there is evidence of two-way causality between mid-quotes and spreads. Order flow is also shown 
to Granger-causes mid-quote changes.  
 
Overall, there is significant evidence across securities that order flow and relative depth forecast 
changes in the mid-quote. There is some evidence that spreads Granger-cause changes in quotes 
and that quote changes Granger-cause changes in spreads. But overall there is a lack of 
uniformity across securities. Looking at the results across securities it is impossible to conclude 
that any one variable is exogenous. In addition, two variables may affect one another through a 
third. More work is needed to properly identify the relationship between these variables. For now, 
we take an agnostic approach and include all four variables in the VAR in each market.  
 
We now examine the dynamics associated with innovations in quotes, order flow, relative depth 
and spreads. For each security market, impulse response functions are calculated to trace out the   13 
effect of a one-time shock to order flow, relative depth, and spreads. Because the innovations are 
correlated, we use the inverse of the Cholesky decomposition of the residual covariance matrix to 
orthogonalize the impulses. While we present impulse response functions with the following 
ordering: order flow, relative depth, spreads and the change in the mid-quote, results are very 
similar across orderings. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the cumulative effect on the change in the mid-quote from three types of 
shocks: a one-standard deviation shock to order flow, to relative depth, and to spreads. Two 
standard error bounds are also shown in each graph. The long-term cumulative implied mid-quote 
change that occurs subsequent to an innovation in each variable may be interpreted as the 
informational content of that variable. An order flow shock has a permanent and positive impact 
on the prices of all European securities and the Canadian 2-year bond. This finding is consistent 
with previous research in the fixed-income microstructure literature suggesting that order flow is 
informative since it has a permanent impact on prices. Specifically, it implies that dealers with 
private information execute market orders against the prevailing best bid and offer quotes.  
 
Across all securities, relative depth has an initial negative impact on prices. There is one possible 
explanation for the initial and temporary drop in the mid-quote. A rise in depth on the buy side of 
the order book reduces the marginal cost of selling a security. Dealers attempting to manage their 
excess inventories use this opportunity to immediately execute market sell orders rather than use 
limit orders. Coefficient estimates suggest that in a number of markets relative depth has a 
negative effect on order flow. The execution of sell orders may inadvertently signal negative 
information to other dealers about the value of the security. Once dealers figure out their mistake, 
quotes will revert to their initial long-run equilibrium level. 
 
While innovations in spreads generally have no impact on prices in European securities markets, 
they do have a significant impact on price dynamics in the Canadian 2-year bond sector. An 
increase in spreads results in a permanent reduction in prices. From an informational perspective, 
large spreads in the market may convince dealers that informed traders may exist in the market. If 
liquidity decreases as a result, price may fall temporarily. If the information risk persists, 
investors will demand a required rate of return that includes a risk premia. Spreads, much like 
order flow, seems to be informative to dealers in the Canadian market. They have a permanent 
impact on the mid-quote. While there are some important differences across securities markets, 
within four to five time periods, or a few hours, private information in either marketplace has 
dissipated.   14 
 
As an alternative approach to determine which variables are informative in the price discovery 
process, Table 4 presents a decomposition of mid-quotes in terms of each component in the VAR 
system. Results at the 20-period-ahead forecast horizon are shown. We examine this relatively 
long forecast horizon so as to focus only on the long-run, or permanent, explanatory power of 
each variable. Since the variance decomposition is based on a Cholesky identification 
assumption, the ordering of the variables will be important. The table displays the upper- and 
lower-bound estimates of the variance decomposition for each endogenous variable across all 
possible orderings of order flow, relative depth, and spreads. Each column gives the percentage of 
the overall forecast variance explained by innovations in each variable.
9 
 
Order flow has some explanatory power for certain European securities. For example, order flow 
explains around 3 or 4 % of the variation in quotes in the Italian and Belgian 12-month bill 
markets. The number is significantly larger for the Government of Canada 2-year bond (7%). In 
Europe, restrictions on quotes allow dealers to share their inventory risk cheaply through the 
immediate execution of market orders. Consequently, order flow will reflect both inventory 
management and private information considerations, and for this reason explain a smaller 
proportion of the variation in returns than in Canadian interdealer brokered markets where no 
quoting obligations exist. Order flow has little (<1%) explanatory power in the German 6-month 
and 2-year bond markets. Cheung, de Jong and Rindi (2005) find that trading of German fixed-
income securities is concentrated in the liquid EUREX futures market. As a result, price 
discovery most likely occurs in the futures market.  
 
Relative depth has some explanatory power only in the French 6-month bill (above 4%) and the 
French 12-month bill (around 3%) markets. In the Canadian market, relative depth is not 
informative at all. There is a possible explanation. Quoting restrictions in European markets 
diminish the quality of the signal associated with relative depth, while in Canada, the absence of 
transparency and quoting restrictions may result in concealed levels of depth. 
 
There is a very small role for spreads in the long-run price-discovery process across European 
securities. Since minimum spreads are restricted in Europe, and pre-trade quote transparency is 
significant, the information content of spreads on the mid-quote is lower in these markets. Any 
variation in spreads must be related to the management of inventories, which will adjust in the 
short-run. In the Canadian 2-year bond market, the results are significantly different. Spreads 
                                                   
9 Each row will not add up to 100 since we have reported maximums and minimums across all orderings.   15 
explain around 12% of the long-term variability in prices. Dealers with private information in the 
Canadian market adjust their quotes strategically, and market spreads reflect these adjustments. 
Since quotes are not fully transparent this information may not be reflected in the mid-quote 
immediately. 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examine the dynamics of prices, order flow, relative depth, and spreads in short-
term European and Canadian government securities markets. Overall, the impulse response 
functions and the variance decompositions illustrate that in European markets, order flow, relative 
depth and spreads are only slightly informative. These results also suggest that European markets 
are usually efficient. Market participants are able to quickly absorb private information elsewhere 
in the market by observing changes in the limit order book and order flow. In Canadian markets, 
where order flow has a permanent and positive impact on quotes, while spreads have a permanent 
and negative impact on quotes, market prices are not always at their efficient levels.  
 
The order flow result is a common finding in studies examining longer-term U.S. Treasuries. 
Since quotes are to some extent transparent in Canadian markets, the combination of both quoting 
obligations and transparency may be required to generate greater levels of price discovery. While 
there are some differences in trade and quote dynamics, both Canadian and European short-term 
fixed-income markets reflect fundamental information in a short amount of time. The results of 
this paper confirm some previous findings. For example, Albanesi and Rindi (2000) also find 
little evidence of asymmetric information in Italian bond trading. The comparison of European 
and Canadian markets illustrates which market structures may be a contributing factor to greater 
market efficiency.  
 
There is still one possible drawback concerning the European system. The MTS liquidity pact is 
often characterized as “forced liquidity.” It is not clear how these markets will behave in stressful 
or disorderly periods. Liquid and efficient government securities markets are important to a 
country’s overall economic well-being. They are necessary to ensure that savings and investment 
decisions are made optimally. They also perform a number of key roles. For example, given their 
virtually default-free nature, government securities are used as benchmarks for the pricing and 
hedging of other fixed-income securities. Monetary policy makers, concerned about disorderly   16 




In future research, we will build on the results of this paper and explore how trading and quoting 
decisions are jointly determined across on-the-run and off-the-run securities markets. Since 
dealers in fixed-income markets usually manage a portfolio of securities within a given maturity 
sector, if securities are substitutable, a dealer can have a long position in one security and an 
offsetting short position in another and bear little inventory risk. Primary dealers of both on- and 
off-the-run securities can manage risk in their portfolio by adjusting prices and liquidity supplies 
of the two securities jointly. We will also seek to determine if private information learned about 
one security is used in the pricing decisions of other similar securities. Inventory control effects 
may link on- and off-the-run securities.  
                                                   
10 Johnson (2003) describes how simple expectations-based models can be utilized to extract expectations. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Macro news announcements. 
Macroeconomic news announcements whose release days are excluded from the data 
 
Country  News 
Belgium  Business Confidence Level 
Italy  Consumer Price Index 
  Industrial Production 
  Consumer Confidence 
  Retail Sales 
  Trade Balance 
  Industrial Orders 
  Business Confidence 
  Produced Price Index 
France  Consumer Confidence Indicator 
  Consumer Price Index 
  Trade Balance 
  Production Outlook Indicator 
  Industrial Production 
  Consumer Spending 
  Business Confidence Indicator 
  Unemployment Change 
Germany  Retail Sales 
  Unemployment Change 
  Factory Orders 
  Trade Balance 
  Current Account 
  Industrial Production 
  Producer Price Index 
  IFO Survey 
  ZEW Survey on Economic Sentiment 
  Import Price Index  
Euro-wide announcement  ECB Announcement on Interest Rates 
  EU Harmonised CPI 
Canada  Current Account 
  Industrial Production Prices 
  Net Change in Employment 
  Raw Materials Price Index 
US  Change in Non-farm Payrolls 
  Retail Sales  Less Autos 
  CPI Excluding Food and Energy 
  PPI Excluding Food and Energy 
   20 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
The mid-quote change is the 30-minute change in mid-quote times 1000. Relative depth is defined as  ) k price he best as depth at t rice best bid p (depth at  t t -  in which depth  is 
measured in million of dollars or euros. Order flow of the bond, 
t orderflow , is defined as the aggregate number of buyer-initiated orders minus seller-initiated order during each 
half-hour interval. The best bid-offer spread is defined as (best offer price - the best bid price)*100. 
 
French 6-month            Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.02  1.48  -0.07  0.00  -0.02  1.00  0.01  0.10  -0.08  0.09  -0.13  292 
Spread  0.73  0.34  0.74  0.64  0.58    1.00  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.01   
Order flow  0.00  0.42  0.03  0.02  0.05      1.00  -0.02  0.00  -0.01   
Bid depth  15.48  12.65  0.43  0.30  0.27        1.00  0.17  0.70   
Offer depth  15.75  11.11  0.58  0.47  0.37          1.00  -0.58   
Relative depth  -0.27  15.38  0.45  0.32  0.26            1.00   
                         
Italian 6-month 
           
Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.01  2.19  -0.13  -0.02  -0.04  1.00  0.07  0.17  -0.04  0.02  -0.05  295 
Spread  0.59  0.70  0.71  0.65  0.65    1.00  -0.03  -0.16  -0.17  0.05   
Order flow  0.02  1.25  0.03  0.03  0.01      1.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.02   
Bid depth  6.75  6.65  0.56  0.44  0.39        1.00  0.27  0.39   
Offer depth  7.53  9.73  0.62  0.51  0.47          1.00  -0.78   
Relative depth  -0.78  10.16  0.48  0.36  0.31            1.00   
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Table 2 (continued) 
German 6-month            Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.05  1.43  -0.10  0.02  0.00  1.00  -0.03  0.10  -0.05  0.00  -0.03  269 
Spread  0.80  0.31  0.75  0.65  0.57    1.00  -0.02  -0.01  -0.07  0.05   
Order flow  0.01  0.34  0.16  0.03  0.04      1.00  0.00  0.03  -0.03   
Bid depth  12.71  8.97  0.56  0.42  0.42        1.00  0.10  0.53   
Offer depth  13.89  12.49  0.65  0.46  0.38          1.00  -0.79   
Relative depth  -1.18  14.64  0.61  0.42  0.36            1.00   
                         
Belgian 12-month            Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.03  4.70  -0.02  0.02  0.00  1.00  -0.01  0.18  -0.02  0.05  -0.05  379 
Spread  1.49  0.66  0.73  0.61  0.54    1.00  0.00  0.03  0.05  -0.01   
Order flow  0.00  0.50  0.11  0.06  0.00      1.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01   
Bid depth  13.54  13.15  0.49  0.35  0.24        1.00  0.12  0.78   
Offer depth  12.80  9.55  0.46  0.35  0.29          1.00  -0.52   
Relative depth  0.74  15.29  0.41  0.30  0.20            1.00   
                         
Italian 12-month            Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.04  4.92  -0.03  -0.03  0.01  1.00  0.01  0.20  0.00  0.03  -0.02  295 
Spread  0.84  0.63  0.66  0.51  0.45    1.00  -0.01  -0.20  -0.18  -0.01   
Order flow  0.08  1.32  0.08  0.04  0.02      1.00  -0.01  0.04  -0.04   
Bid depth  6.91  6.63  0.46  0.36  0.32        1.00  0.31  0.59   
Offer depth  6.46  6.67  0.42  0.34  0.28          1.00  -0.59   
Relative depth  0.45  7.82  0.27  0.16  0.09            1.00     22 
Table 2 (continued) 
 
French 12-month            Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.06  4.88  -0.03  0.01  -0.01  1.00  0.01  0.10  -0.04  0.07  -0.09  294 
Spread  1.54  0.66  0.71  0.59  0.54    1.00  0.02  0.01  -0.07  0.06   
Order flow  -0.03  0.49  0.02  -0.01  -0.02      1.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.04   
Bid depth  16.26  12.65  0.45  0.37  0.28        1.00  0.11  0.72   
Offer depth  15.92  11.12  0.43  0.36  0.32          1.00  -0.61   
Relative depth  0.34  15.86  0.39  0.32  0.25            1.00   
                         
German 2-year            Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.09  14.89  0.00  -0.01  0.02  1.00  0.00  0.06  -0.03  0.04  -0.06  255 
Spread  2.61  0.96  0.60  0.42  0.35    1.00  0.00  0.08  0.07  0.02   
Order flow  0.00  0.36  0.09  0.03  0.01      1.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00   
Bid depth  32.81  29.97  0.54  0.41  0.34        1.00  0.19  0.74   
Offer depth  26.64  23.54  0.42  0.33  0.27          1.00  -0.52   
Relative depth  6.17  34.34  0.42  0.31  0.27            1.00   
                         
Canadian 2-year            Correlations             
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation  r1  r 2  r 3 
Mid-quote  
change  Spread  Order flow  Bid depth  Offer depth  Relative depth  Days 
Mid-quote change  0.23  27.26  -0.17  -0.08  0.00  1.00  -0.15  0.26  0.00  0.03  -0.01  202 
Spread  1.26  3.51  0.24  0.02  0.02    1.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00   
Order flow  0.06  2.13  0.10  0.02  0.01      1.00  0.02  0.00  0.02   
Bid depth  4.84  12.66  0.13  0.08  0.01        1.00  0.18  0.77   
Offer depth  4.25  9.29  0.05  0.01  0.07          1.00  -0.49   
Relative depth  0.59  14.33  0.12  0.05  0.01            1.00   
  
Table 3: Granger Causality Tests and Order of VARs 
The table presents p-values of pair-wise Granger-causality tests and the lowest lag order that minimized the 
Akaike or Schwarz information criterion. Wald statistics were calculated under the null hypothesis that the 
lags of each endogenous variable in each equation are jointly zero. Pair-wise Granger causality tests 
determine whether an endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous.  The mid-quote change, 
t p D , is the 
30-minute change in mid-quote times 1000. Relative depth is defined as 
) k price he best as depth at t price  best bid   (depth at rdepth t t t - = , where depth is measured in millions of euros 
or dollars. Order flow of the bond, 
t orderflow , is the defined as the aggregate volume of buyer-initiated 
orders minus seller-initiated orders during the half hour interval. The best bid-offer spread is defined as the 
difference between the best offer price and the best bid price times 100.  
 



















Dependent variable:  t orderflow  
t rdepth  
 0.408   0.104   0.000   0.588   0.055   0.004   0.019   0.253 
t spread  
 0.421   0.106   0.007   0.236   0.003   0.186   0.991   0.225 
t p D  
 0.716   0.118   0.017   0.218   0.535   0.454   0.386   0.002 
Dependent variable:  t rdepth 
t orderflow
   0.743   0.003   0.926   0.031   0.453   0.726   0.686   0.564 
t spread  
 0.179   0.622   0.304   0.246   0.333   0.577   0.708   0.630 
t p D  
 0.437   0.656   0.848   0.434   0.412   0.865   0.026   0.734 
Dependent variable:  t spread  
t orderflow
   0.064   0.390   0.821   0.974   0.009   0.450   0.974   0.000 
t rdepth  
 0.144   0.973   0.284   0.976   0.490   0.106   0.976   0.686 
t p D  
 0.329   0.243   0.010   0.873   0.000   0.498   0.045   0.000 
Dependent variable:  t p D  
t orderflow
   0.557   0.001   0.056   0.765   0.349   0.096   0.088   0.000 
t rdepth  
 0.000   0.023   0.978   0.253   0.003   0.000   0.000   0.587 
t spread  
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Table 4: Variance decompositions of Price Changes 
The table reports the percentage of the 20-period ahead forecast variance in prices due to each innovation, 
with each row adding up to 100. Since the variance decomposition (based on a Cholesky identification 
assumption) can be affected by the ordering of the variables in the VAR, both lower and upper bounds are 
reported by looking at all combinations of 
t orderflow  
t rdepth and 
t spread  in the VAR ordering. The 
second column, labelled "S.E.", contains the forecast error of the mid-quote at the 20-period forecast 
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Figure 1: Response of Price change to the Order Flow, Imbalance and Spread.  
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